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Abstract:  This paper investigates the effect of relative income on marriage.  Accounting flexibly 
for absolute income, the ratio between a man’s income and a local reference group median is a 
strong predictor of marital status, but only for low-income men.  Relative income affects 
marriage even among those living with a partner.  A ten percent higher reference group income 
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I.  Introduction 
  Low-income men are less likely to marry.  Among 25-34-year-old white men in the 2000 
Census, for example, 34 percent of those in the bottom quarter of the income distribution are 
married, compared with 67 percent of those in the top quarter of the income distribution.  For 
blacks, the numbers are 16 percent and 50 percent respectively.
1  The decline in marriage since 
1960 has been most pronounced at the bottom of the income distribution.
2
  Marriage is tied to important outcomes, including the stability of partnerships, the health 
and well-being of couples, and a wide range of outcomes for children.  Burstein (2007) 
summarizes four recent reviews and concludes that “[w]hile causation is nearly impossible to 
prove, the very strong associations must at least be acknowledged.(p.387)”  There are reasons to 
believe that, by raising the social and financial costs of exit, marriage offers benefits beyond 
those realized by cohabiting couples.
  
3  Furthermore, there may be externalities associated with 
declining aggregate marriage rates, and these may be most acutely felt at the bottom of the 
income distribution. Marriage promotion is also a key underpinning of recent anti-poverty efforts 
(Lerman, 2002).
4
  Previous explanations for low and declining marriage rates for low-income men 
emphasize on the role of economic security in determining whether a man is “marriageable.”  
Here we explore the possibility that, conditional on absolute income, income relative to a local 
reference group is an important determinant of the marriage decision.   We build on Easterlin’s 
(1980) suggestion that income relative to aspirations affects marriage and childbearing.  
Specifically, we hypothesize that individuals perceive a threshold income required for marriage, 
and that this threshold is influenced by an individual’s local reference group.   
  Understanding why couples, and particularly low-income couples, choose to 
marry or not marry is therefore of heightened policy interest.   Watson and McLanahan 3 
 
 
  The results suggest that relative income is a strong predictor of marital status.  After 
carefully accounting for cost-of-living-adjusted absolute income, low-income men are less likely 
to be married when they are farther from the median income in their reference group.  High-
income men, on the other hand, are largely unaffected by relative income concerns.  A ten 
percent increase in reference group income reduces the probability of marriage by about two 
percent.  We explore metropolitan area reference groups determined by race and education. 
  Our theoretical framework builds on Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) model of identity.  
We hypothesize that one benefit of marriage is the utility couples gain from thinking of 
themselves in the category of “married people.”  This category entails certain prescriptions for 
behavior and characteristics, including a particular standard of living associated with marriage.  
When couples are far from achieving this norm, they benefit less from marrying, and therefore 
are less likely to do so.  We posit that the income threshold varies across local race/ethnicity and 
education groups, allowing us to separately identify the effects of absolute and relative income.   
  This paper contributes to a growing literature which attempts to isolate the causal 
influence of relative income on a diverse set of behaviors and outcomes.  Recent and historic 
work has explored the link between relative income and subjective well-being (Clark, Frijters, 
and Shields (2008); Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008); Luttmer (2005), and others), health 
outcomes and health behaviors (Miller and Paxson (2006), Eibner and Evans (2005), and others), 
female labor supply (Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998), consumption and savings (Denizer, 
Holger, and Ying, 2000; Kosicki, 1987; Duesenberry, 1949), homeownership (Withers, 1998), 
suicide (Daly, Wilson, and Johnson, 2007), social capital (Fischer and Torgler, 2006), and even 
soccer performance (Torgler and Schmidt, 2007).  To our knowledge, we are the first to Watson and McLanahan 4 
 
 
systematically examine the link between relative income and the marriage decisions of 
individuals.   
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I discusses the link between income and 
marriage.  In Section II, we develop a simple theoretical framework which incorporates the 
notion of identity to the marriage decision.   We discuss the “middle class marriage ideal” in 
Section III.  Section IV describes the data and empirical strategy, and section V reports results.  
Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  Income and Marriage 
  Our analysis focuses on the years 1980-2000.  During that period, there was a roughly 15 
percentage point decline in marriage for young white men across the income distribution.  
Declines for black men were 11 to 18 percentage points and greatest in the second quartile of the 
income distribution.  These changes represent a larger percentage change in marriage at the 
bottom of the income distribution for all groups.   
  As noted by Burstein (2007), economic models suggest reasons why the poor might be 
either more or less likely to marry.  The classic economic model of marriage posited by Becker 
(1981) hinges on specialization in home production. The gains from specialization and public 
goods (Lam, 1988) might be particularly important to a disadvantaged couple.  On the other 
hand, if men’s incomes are low relative to women’s at the bottom of the distribution, the gains 
from specialization are muted and marriage becomes less likely among disadvantaged couples.  
Furthermore, tax policy and means-tested social insurance programs may discourage marriage, 
and the disincentives might be particularly pronounced at the bottom of the income distribution.
5 Watson and McLanahan 5 
 
 
  The structure of marriage markets also plays a potentially important role in discouraging 
marriage at the bottom of the income distribution.  Loughran (2002) and Gould and Paserman 
(2003) document the negative effect of rising male income inequality on marriage rates, arguing 
that income dispersion extends the female search process.  Willis (1999) suggests that uneven 
sex ratios and adequate support for single mothers can lead to an equilibrium in which low-
income men remain unmarried and father children with multiple partners. 
  The existing economic models of specialization and marriage markets suggest that low-
income men may be less likely to form long-term partnerships.  However, economic theory is 
less well-developed on how income affects the decision to marry once such partnerships are 
formed.
6
  Qualitative work by Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan (2005) suggests that financial 
status affects the marriage decision even among co-residing couples with children.
  Unmarried cohabitation is an increasingly common status; in the 2002 National Survey 
of Family Growth 50 percent of women aged 15 to 44 had cohabited at some point and 59 
percent of marriages were preceded by cohabitation (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007).  A large 
majority of cohabiters expect or hope to marry (Lichter, 2006).  Still, a majority of cohabiting 
unions do not transition to marriage in five years, either because of dissolution or inertia.  More 
than a fifth of cohabiting couples in 2002 had been living together at least five years (Stevenson 
and Wolfers, 2007).  These facts imply that barriers to marriage exist among co-residing couples. 
7  Although all 
of the couples in the Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan study have young children together 
and a majority co-reside, many opt to postpone marriage for financial reasons.  Respondents 
repeatedly point to markers of a middle class lifestyle as pre-requisites for marriage, though the 
perceived necessities vary across individuals.  Examples include a washer-dryer, a single-family 
house with a garage, a couples “own place”, a car, and a big wedding.  We posit that the Watson and McLanahan 6 
 
 
financial resources viewed as necessary for marriage depend on an individual’s local reference 
group. 
  The Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan study suggests that marriage is associated with 
a set of prescriptions (norms) for behavior and financial status. Without the financial 
wherewithal to meet these expectations, cohabitation is preferable to marriage.  One married 
couple in the study, for example, is embarrassed to publicly acknowledge their marriage because 
they lack financial independence and still live at home.  The idea of social norms affecting 
decisions can be formalized using an Akerlof and Kranton (2000) identity framework, and we 
use this framework below to model the marriage decision.  
  The notion that marriage is associated with the realization of financial norms is not new.  
Easterlin (1980) posits that couples aspire to a certain standard of living before marrying.  
Wilson (1987), Oppenheimer, Kalmjin, and Lim (1997), and Brown and Kesselring (2003) argue 
that male “marriageability” is contingent on steady employment or a minimum level of earnings.  
Qualitative work by Edin (2000) also points to the importance of financial stability as a precursor 
to marriage.   
  Less clear is how such financial prescriptions are determined.  Easterlin (1980) suggests 
that financial aspirations stem from the standard of living one experienced as a young adult.  But 
the Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan respondents reference a set of norms extending beyond 
their own life experiences.  Here we analyze local reference groups - those comprised of others 
in one’s own metropolitan area, race/ethnicity, and education category.  We are guided by the 
theme of a “middle class lifestyle” that runs throughout the Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan 
study;  we assume that the ideal income targeted by men is that of the median fully employed 







III. A Model of Income, Identity, and Marriage 
 
  Suppose a locality has an equal number of men and women in the marriage market.  Each 
person is endowed with income drawn from the same distribution.  Suppose further that the 
desirability of men and women is represented by their income i Y .  We abstract from the matching 
process and assume men and women are matched by the level of income such that within each 
couple the man and the woman have equal levels of income.  The couples may decide to cohabit 
or marry.  The value of marrying is determined by background characteristics (such as age, 
education, race, income, characteristics of peers) which in turn affect the financial returns and 
personal returns to marriage.  For example, married couples might receive financial benefits or 
incur costs because of tax and welfare policies that interact with their level of income.  The 
personal returns include social rewards for marriage from family and friends as well as the 
psychic benefit of marrying for one’s self-image.     
  Following the model of identity outlined in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we describe 
“married people” as one group c in a set of social categories C with which men and women may 
choose to identify.  Prescriptions P describe the ideal characteristics and behavior for each 
category.  For example, married people might be expected to have a high level of income, to live 
in their own residence apart from extended family, to stay home instead of going to the bar, and 
to exhibit high levels of paternal involvement in childrearing.   
  We assume the category “cohabiting people” has no set of prescriptions.  While this is a 
simplification, the financial hurdle for cohabitation is likely to be much lower than that for 
marriage.  In a study of the relationship between education, marriage and cohabitation, Thorton, Watson and McLanahan 8 
 
 
Axinn, and Teachman (1995) posit that schooling and the associated earning power may be less 
important for cohabitation than for marriage.  The qualitative evidence from Gibson-Davis, Edin, 
and McLanahan (2005) also suggests that cohabitation involves weaker financial prescriptions; 
many respondents already lived together but viewed their economic situation as inadequate for 
marriage.   
  An individual’s self-image  i I  depends on the match between his or her behavior and 
characteristics with the ideals prescribed for his or her category.  In our simple model, we focus 
on the prescription that married people have a certain minimum level of income.  We also allow 
a random error term  i ε  with mean zero to affect an individual’s self image associated with any 
given category. Thus, an individual’s utility can be described by: 
(1)      (, ) i ii i U UYI =  
where  Ii=Ii (Yi, ci, P, εic) ,  /0 ii UY ∂ ∂>, and /0 ii UI ∂ ∂> 
That is, in general an individual’s utility depends on his income and self-image.  Self-image, in 
turn, is a function of interactions between an individual’s income, the category with which he 
identifies, the prescriptions for that category, and a random error term.   
  Suppose that the financial prescription for a married person is at least  ideal Y , where  ideal Y  
is the median income of a given reference group.  The identity payoff for a married person is 
then: 
(2)     







ε = − −+, 
where t is a positive scalar describing the identity loss associated with falling below the 
“marriage ideal”.  The identity payoff for cohabiting is:  
(3)      I i cohab icohab I ε = +  Watson and McLanahan 9 
 
 
and we assume  m II ar cohab > .  In other words, on average a married person meeting the ideal has a 
higher self-image than a cohabiting person. 
  In making the decision whether to marry, an individual compares the utility from 
cohabiting and marriage.  The self-image gained through marriage (relative to cohabitation) is  
(4)     
m (I ) (max(0,1 )) ( )
i





εε = − − − +−  
The gains to self-image through marriage tend to increase with the average gain in self-image 
from marriage and an individual’s income.   The gains decrease with a higher “marriage ideal” 
and a higher penalty t for deviating from the norm.   
  This framework provides some simple comparative statics.  The gain to marriage is 















.   
Similarly, an increase in the marriage ideal  ideal Y  is associated with a decrease in the gain to 
marriage for low values of Yi but no change in the gain for high values of Yi.  A higher level of t 
strengthens the relationship between Yi and marriage below the marriage ideal, and reduces the 
overall marriage rate holding other factors constant.   
 
IV.  Middle-Class Marriage Ideals 
  The model assumes that  ideal Y  is the median income of a relevant reference group.  The 
level of income perceived to be required for marriage is unobservable and presumably differs 
across individuals.  The qualitative evidence described by Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan 
suggests that low-income couples view a middle class lifestyle as a prerequisite to marriage, 
which we define as the median income of a fully employed (full-time, full-year) man in a Watson and McLanahan 10 
 
 
relevant reference group.  Our main analysis assumes the relevant reference group is fully 
employed male workers in the man’s metropolitan area, education group and race/ethnicity 
group, though we also explore other reference groups.
8
  Table 1 shows the average reference group median by year, race/ethnicity, and education.  
For all three race/ethnicity groups, the reference group median falls over time for men with some 
college, high school, or less than high school.  Reference group medians for college graduates 
are generally increasing over time.  These patterns are not surprising given the well-documented 
rise in the return to schooling over the period.  
  These “middle class marriage ideals” 
determined by median reference group income serve as proxies for the income thresholds 
required for marriage. 
  Table 1 also shows the fraction of the sample with income below the reference group 
median.  We expect more than half of men to fall under this hypothesized marriage ideal because 
it represents the earnings of all fully employed (full-time and full-year) men ages 18-64 in the 
race/ethnicity and education group.  In the sample, 58-84 percent of men have incomes below 
their reference group median, with the exact fraction depending on the reference group and 
year.
9
  Appendix Table 1 shows selected reference group medians (hypothesized marriage 
ideals) for the ten largest metropolitan areas in the sample.  Even among very large metropolitan 
areas, there is substantial variation in reference group medians across metro areas and over time.  
For example, in 1980, the median fully employed white man without a high school education in 
Detroit earned a third more than the median such man in Boston.  By the year 2000, this disparity 
was reduced by half.  For white college graduates, the reference group median increased over 
time in all large cities, but grew by 30 percent in San Francisco and only 6 percent in Detroit.  
 Watson and McLanahan 11 
 
 
There is similar variation across areas for black and Hispanic men.  In the empirical analysis 
below, we exploit variation in reference group medians across metropolitan areas to estimate the 
effect of relative income on marriage.    
 
 
V. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
  We use the five percent IPUMS sample of the 1980-2000 U.S. Censuses to investigate 
the determinants of marriage.  We limit our analysis to residents of 109 metropolitan areas for 
which we have complete data; the metropolitan areas are matched to be as geographically 
consistent as possible across three sample years.
10  We use samples for three demographic 
groups:  native born non-Hispanic white men, native born non-Hispanic black men, and native 
born Hispanic men.
11
  A limitation of the Census sample is that it is a repeated cross-section rather than a panel.  
Therefore, we do not know a man’s income at the time of the marriage decision, and we cannot 
evaluate how the exact timing of the marriage decision relates to the income trajectory for an 
individual.  However, we believe that this disadvantage is outweighed by the very large sample 
sizes; there are more than 1.2 million young men in the non-Hispanic white sample.  The large 
samples allow us to precisely estimate the effects of relative income on marital status while 
controlling very flexibly for absolute income and a number of other potential confounders.    
  The samples are restricted to ages 25-34 so that respondents are likely to 
have completed school and are observed at a point likely to be close to the timing of their 
marriage decision.  We exclude the foreign born population because some of these individuals 
may derive norms and expectations about marriage from their home countries. 
  We use reported total real income last year for each man in the Census sample as a proxy 
for his income at the time of the marriage decision.
12  Income is top-coded and bottom-coded in Watson and McLanahan 12 
 
 
the public use data.  To minimize the effect of top- and bottom-coding, and to exclude negative 
reported incomes, we drop men in the top and bottom one percent of each metropolitan area’s 
income distribution in each year.
13
  The dependent variable, married, is equal to one if the man is categorized in the Census 
data as currently married with a spouse present in the household.  We also show in a 
specification check that the results are similar if one treats “ever married” as the outcome and 
that the results are not driven by divorce patterns among young men.
 
14
  As noted above, our main analysis assumes that the man aspires to at least the median 
income of a fully employed (full-time and full-year) man within a particular reference group.  
Throughout the analysis, reference groups are assumed to operate within metropolitan areas.  
Norms that are perpetuated at a national level (for example, through television) are not identified 
here.   
   
  According to the theoretical model, the ratio of one’s own income to the marriage ideal 
should affect the marriage decision, but only for those below the ideal.  The preferred baseline 
specification is as follows: 
(5)     
12 3
45
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where  iremt Married indicates that the individual i in race group r in education group e  in metro 







is the ratio of i's income to the reference group median,  i X  is a vector of 
individual characteristics, and  mt W  is a vector of time-varying metropolitan area characteristics.  
Individual characteristics and metropolitan area characteristics are described in more detail Watson and McLanahan 13 
 
 
below.  In addition, 
irt ycat γ is a vector of dummies indicating income categories adjusted for cost-
of-living (corresponding to the year- and race-specific percentile rank in the national housing-
price-adjusted income distribution) in year t interacted with education and year categories.  Thus, 
the model flexibly accounts for absolute income and allows the effect of income to vary by 
education group-year cell.  These variables also imply that we have flexibly accounted for time 
trends and education group-specific changes in national marriage rates over time.  We also 
include individual age dummies, i age σ , metropolitan area fixed effects,   m θ , and an error term εi.
15
1 β
   
  The key coefficients are  , the effect of the ratio for those under the ideal, and 2 β , the 
effect of the ratio for those above the ideal.  The theoretical framework predicts that  1 β  is 
positive and  2 β is zero.  To our knowledge, we are the first to distinguish between the effect of 
relative income for men lying above and below a hypothesized ideal.  We also report the “slope 
change,”  21 ββ − , which we expect to be negative. 
  The main source of variation stems from a man’s relative income – how his income 
relates to the middle-class marriage ideal determined by his local reference group.  We 
hypothesize that a low-income man is less likely to marry if he lives in a metropolitan area in 
which similar men have high incomes, holding his own income and income rank constant.  A 
sufficiently high-income man, on the other hand, is theoretically unaffected by others in his 
reference group.  The specification described above is designed to capture the effect of a change 
in relative income holding absolute income constant and to distinguish the effect of relative 
income for men above and below the reference group median.   
The variation exploited in the analysis stems from differences in metropolitan area 
income distributions, while holding an individual’s income constant.  For example, an inflow of 
highly productive reference group workers into a man’s metropolitan area could increase the Watson and McLanahan 14 
 
 
reference group median income without affecting the man’s income.  An increase in the 
compensation of the more highly paid workers in a man’s metropolitan area could increase the 
reference group median income without affecting the man’s income or income rank.  
It would be ideal for the purposes of estimation if such changes in the income distribution 
of an individual’s reference group arose randomly.  However, we are forced to rely on observed 
(and potentially non-random) differences in reference group income distributions.   Bias could 
arise if the forces that lead to these reference group income differences also directly affect 
marriage propensities of young low-income men.  For example, a white high school graduate 
earning 20,000 dollars in a city where the typical white high school graduate earns 40,000 may 
have undesirable but unobservable qualities compared to a similar man earning 20,000 dollars in 
a city where a typical white high school graduate earns 30,000.  We cannot fully overcome the 
limitations imposed by an observational study, but in the work below we do our best to control 
for observable characteristics of both men and metropolitan areas.   
To address concerns about the endogeneity of relative income, we incorporate a rich set 
of metropolitan area control variables.  All models include metropolitan area fixed effects to 
account for unobserved characteristics of cities that do not change over time.  We also control for 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the metropolitan residents – fraction native 
black, fraction native Hispanic, fraction foreign-born, fraction with a high school degree, fraction 
with some college, fraction with a college degree or more, fraction under 18, and fraction under 
65.  We control for the male employment-to-population ratio and predicted male and female 
employment levels based on 1980 industrial mix.  We include additional controls for the 
race/ethnicity specific sex ratios in the metropolitan area, the ACCRA housing price index, the 
log of real housing-price-adjusted AFDC/TANF benefits for a family of three in the state, and Watson and McLanahan 15 
 
 
the log of the metropolitan area population.
16
  Our theoretical framework abstracts from marriage market considerations and the search 
process.  Though we believe relative and absolute income are both likely to influence the 
probability that a man finds a partner, it is the decision to marry conditional on partnership that is 
of interest here.  Empirically, partnership is not observable in all cases, so we address the 
marriage market and search issues in two ways.  First, we control for factors that are likely to 
affect the probability that a man is matched with a partner.
  We also consider potential alternative explanations 
for our results, though in the absence of an experimental design we cannot definitively rule out 
the possibility that unobserved factors are shaping marriage decisions and affecting the reference 
group income distribution at the same time. 
17
  Table 2 shows means for each of the three samples.  After excluding the top and bottom 
one percent of each metropolitan area’s income distribution, those living in group quarters, and 
those in excluded metropolitan areas, the final sample of native non-Hispanic white men is 1.2 
million observations.  For black men, the final sample size is roughly 160,000 and for Hispanic 
men the sample is almost 77,000.  Marriage rates have fallen substantially over time for all three 
groups and are lowest in the sample of black men. 
  Second, in section V.B. below, we 
replicate the main analysis restricting the sample to those men already living with a partner. We 
expect marriage market search considerations to be considerably dampened for co-residing men.       
 
VI.  Results 
A. Baseline Analysis 
  The model suggests that relative income matters to the marriage decision.  In particular, 
we posit that a man is more likely to marry when his income approaches the median income of Watson and McLanahan 16 
 
 
fully employed workers in his reference group.  The ratio of income to the reference group 
median is expected to predict marital status below the reference group median, but not above it.  
  In Table 3, we examine the relative income hypothesis in a linear probability model.  
Column I simply relates the log of real income to marital status for non-Hispanic white men.  An 
additional log point of income raises the probability of being married by 12.5 percentage points, 
holding many individual and metropolitan area characteristics constant.  This result is consistent 
with the large literature suggesting that absolute income is an important predictor of marriage.   
  Column II of Table 3 indicates that, controlling log-linearly for his own income, a man is 
8.2 percentage points less likely to be married if his income falls below the reference group 
median.  The theoretical framework implies that is the ratio of income to the reference group 
median that affects marital status.  As shown in column III, the ratio of a man’s own income to 
the ideal has a highly significant relationship to marriage below the ideal.  The ratio between 
income and the ideal is also statistically significant for men above the ideal, but the coefficient is 
much smaller and the slope change is highly significant.   
  The evidence in the third column is consistent with the idea that relative income is 
important, but could also reflect an underlying non-linear relationship between income and 
marriage.  We prefer a more flexible specification.  We calculate income percentile groups of the 
national income distribution and interact these with year*education indicators.
18
  The results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.  Column IV of Table 3 shows 
that the ratio of a man’s income to the median reference group income significantly increases the 
  Thus, we 
include nearly 1200 income dummy variables into the model to allow the effect of income 
percentile to vary by year and education group.  These variables also account for national 
changes in the propensity for different income groups and education groups to marry over time.   Watson and McLanahan 17 
 
 
probability of marriage below the reference group median, but not above it.  The magnitude of 
the coefficient suggests that moving one’s income from 70
 to 80 percent of the marriage ideal, 
for example, increases the probability of marriage by 3.8 percentage points.  In contrast, moving 
from 120 to 130 percent slightly decreases the probability of marriage, conditional on absolute 
income.  The estimated slope change is large and statistically significant.  We prefer the model in 
column IV of Table 3 because it is conservative, and we treat it as our baseline model.   
  The baseline results focus on two groups of men:  those above and below the 
hypothesized ideal.  Figure 1 offers more detail.  Among white men, the effect of relative income 
is most pronounced for those with income levels between one quarter and three quarters of the 
level of the reference group median.  The effect of relative income is muted for the poorest men 
in the sample; it is possible that these men do not aspire to the reference group median.  For each 
ratio category above one, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero.   
  Another way of examining the information is to look by decile in the metropolitan area-
race-education group income distribution.  Roughly seventy percent of men lie below the 
reference group median, so it is in the bottom seventy percent of the distribution that we expect 
relative income to matter.  That is indeed what we see in Figure 2, with the largest effect around 
the third decile. 
  We also examine the effect of relative income for different race/ethnicity groups.  
Column V of Table 3 shows the baseline analysis repeated non-Hispanic black men.  For black 
men, the results accord well with the prediction of the model:  a positive effect of the ratio below 
the reference group median, a small and statistically insignificant effect of the ratio above it, and 
a statistically significant slope change.  Black men are more likely to be married when their 
income approaches the median of fully employed men in their reference group. Above the Watson and McLanahan 18 
 
 
reference group median relative income has little effect once absolute income is held constant.  
The story is similar for Hispanic men, as shown in column VI of Table 3.  The probability of 
marriage depends on the median income of a reference group, but only when a man is below that 
income.
19
  In sum, the baseline model indicates that relative income is linked to marital status for 
those below the median of a local reference group, but not for those above the median.  The 
association is robust to the inclusion of flexible controls for absolute income.  As will be 
documented below, the relationship persists across many alternative specifications and sample 
restrictions.  First, however, we discuss alternative explanations for our results. 
   
 
B.  Marriage Markets, Cohabitation, and Fatherhood 
  We have documented a relationship between marital status of young men and their 
income relative to a local reference group.  Our proposed explanation is that couples gain utility 
by achieving a certain level of financial security before marriage, and that this level is 
determined in part by those around them.  The notion that couples postpone marriage until they 
can achieve a middle class lifestyle is supported by previous qualitative literature (Gibson-Davis, 
Edin, and McLanahan, 2005).  Nevertheless, there are other potential reasons that the marriage 
decisions of young men could be linked to the incomes of those around them. 
  One important class of explanations relates to the marriage market.  A man whose 
relative income falls becomes a less desirable mate compared to his peers even if his purchasing 
power remains constant.  Furthermore, if income inequality is high, a standard search model 
predicts that women will choose a higher “reservation income” in searching for a mate and will Watson and McLanahan 19 
 
 
search longer, as has been shown in empirical work by Loughran (2002) and Gould and 
Paserman (2003).     
  We believe marriage market considerations are potentially important and we examine this 
issue in several ways.  First, we control for a man’s decile rank in his metropolitan area-race 
group or metropolitan area-race-education group.  The thought experiment represented by this 
specification is one in which the earnings of middle-income and high-income men increase, but 
low-income men maintain their income and income rank.  Inclusion of rank controls slightly 
attenuates the results, as shown in columns II and III of Appendix Table 2, but the pattern retains 
is statistical significance.
20
  Second, in column IV of Appendix Table 2 we directly control for inequality, which we 
believe should affect the willingness of women to choose a man with a particular level of 
income.  We allow the effect of both income inequality in the metropolitan area and income 
inequality in the race/ethnicity-education group to differ based on whether the man is above or 
below the reference group median.  The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these 
variables. 
      
  Third, we consider a subsample of men who are already residing with a partner.  We 
believe search considerations should be considerably dampened for this group.  It should be 
noted that there are several limitations to this analysis.  First, for unmarried men, a cohabiting 
relationship can only be observed in the Census if the man or his partner is the household head.  
We limit the analysis to men who are household heads or have partners or spouses who are 
household heads (the household head sample).  This introduces selection bias to the extent that 
the decision to form a separate household is linked to the decision to co-reside with a partner.  In 
addition, the 1980 Census does not distinguish between unmarried partners and roommates.  For Watson and McLanahan 20 
 
 
consistency across all three Census years, we define an unmarried man as cohabiting if he has 
either a female roommate or an unmarried partner.
21
  We start by replicating the baseline analysis for the household head sample in column I 
of Table 4.  The household head sample is substantially smaller than the overall sample for all 
three groups, suggesting that a substantial fraction of young men do not maintain their own 
households.  There is a significant slope change in the household head sample for whites, blacks, 
and Hispanics, though the effect is muted compared to the full sample. 
       
  It is helpful to consider whether those whose marriage decisions are affected by relative 
income would otherwise be living with a partner or not.  The answer differs by race/ethnicity 
group, as shown in columns II and III.  For whites and Hispanics, it appears that relative income 
most often moves low-income men from the category of non-co-residing to the category of 
married.  For black men, on the other hand, it appears that a majority of those whose marriage 
decisions are affected by relative income would otherwise be living with a partner.  These 
findings are unsurprising given the relatively high rates of non-marital cohabitation for black 
men. 
  We now return to the question of whether relative income considerations drive marriage 
decisions for men living with a partner.  As shown in column V of Table 4, the ratio of a man’s 
income to the reference group median is linked to marriage among co-residing men in all three 
groups.  Comparing columns I and V, we see that the effect of relative income is more modest 
for co-residing men, especially white and Hispanic men.  If one were willing to assume that the 
difference in the effect of relative income between co-residers and all household heads is largely 
driven by search, and that search is not a major determinant of marriage for men once they live Watson and McLanahan 21 
 
 
with a partner, search considerations explain perhaps half of the effect of relative income for 
white and Hispanic men and little of the effect for black men.
22
  For white, black, and Hispanic men, there is a positive effect of the income ratio below 
the median and a zero or negative effect above the median for co-residing men, suggesting that 
relative income considerations affect marriage even for men who live with a partner. For men 
living with a partner and children, the effects are smaller, but for all groups there is a statistically 
significant slope change as predicted by the model. 
   
  It is worth comparing the effect of relative income on marriage to its effect on 
fatherhood, though there are some limitations to the fatherhood analysis.  A man is listed as 
having children in the household if he lives with his own children or his step-children; the latter 
label is endogenous to the marriage decision.  Also, it is not possible to observe fatherhood if the 
man does not live in the same household as his children.  Our solution is to describe the man as 
living with children if he lives with a female partner who has children (regardless of whether 
they are described as his own). The outcome observed is co-residential social fatherhood. 
  For white men, the effects of relative income on marriage and on fatherhood are quite 
similar.  This likely stems from the fact that marriage and fatherhood are tightly linked in this 
population.  Among black men, on the other hand, there is no apparent relationship between 
relative income and fatherhood.  For this group, relative income appears to affect the decision to 
marry but not the decision to live with a woman and children.
23
  Our reading of the evidence is that while marriage market considerations are important, 
they are not the full story.  Controlling for metropolitan area characteristics that could affect the 
marriage market does not substantively affect the results. We see a smaller but statistically and 
economically significant effect of relative income among co-residing men of all three 
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race/ethnicity groups.  Even among those already living with their partners, men are more likely 
to be married as their income approaches a reference group median.   
 
C.  Alternative Explanations 
  Aside from marriage market considerations, there are other reasons we could see an 
association between a man’s relative income and his propensity to be married.   For example, 
stable employment is frequently cited as a necessary condition for marriage (Wilson, 1987).  In 
the baseline, we control for employment status and whether the man works full-time and worked 
a full year in the previous calendar year.  Omitting these controls does not substantively change 
the results, as shown in column V of Appendix Table 2.  We also repeat the analysis restricting 
to men who are full-time full-year workers; the results are similar to the baseline though a bit 
muted for black men (see column VI).   
  Another possibility is that we have not fully accounted for differences in absolute income 
in our models.  Our preferred model includes over one thousand dummy variables indicating real 
cost-of-living adjusted income – each category representing a percentile of the national housing-
price adjusted income distribution in a given year and interacted with year and education group.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that the income category dummy variables do not appropriately 
account for cost-of-living differences across metropolitan areas. In the baseline, we adjust for 
cost-of-living differences by assuming 0.36 of expenditures are affected by housing prices, as 
suggested by Albouy (2008).  We experiment with alternative adjustments for cost of living in 
columns VII and VIII of Appendix Table 2 and the results are not substantively affected.  In 
column IX, we drop the control for the housing price index and in column X we include a control 
for the man’s income divided by the housing price index in his area.  None of these alternative Watson and McLanahan 23 
 
 
approaches to accounting for housing price differentials across metropolitan areas make a 
substantive difference to the results. 
  A final concern is that men may receive a wage boost when they are married because of 
employer discrimination or because they increase their productivity.  Unfortunately, the Census 
data do not allow us to examine how the trajectory of income relates to the timing of marriage.  
Even in longitudinal data, it would be difficult to distinguish between a boost to earnings around 
the time of marriage caused by employer discrimination and an exogenous boost to earnings 
which pushes a couple towards marriage.
24
  In the final column of Appendix Table 2, we restrict the sample to men that are ages 25 
and 26 only.  We assume these men are relatively close to the timing of their marriage decision, 
and that their wages are less likely to reflect employer discrimination (which may not happen 
instantaneously).  The basic pattern in the results holds even for the youngest men in the sample, 
though standard errors are larger and statistical significance is weakened.  
  We use two methods to investigate whether this 
concern is important.  First, we simulate a world in which each man receives an unexpected 
earnings bonus at the time of marriage due to employer favoritism.  Specifically, married men 
are assumed to have been earning only 90 percent of observed income at the time of the marriage 
decision.  We then repeat the analysis using the lower income for married men, and the resulting 
coefficients on the ratio*under variable are smaller but retain their statistical significance (see 
column XI of Appendix Table 2).   
  Though the evidence is highly suggestive of link between relative income and marriage, 
we cannot prove that the relationship is causal.  To do so, one would need to randomly assign 
reference group income without changing a man’s own income or the characteristics of his 
metropolitan area.  There may be unobservable characteristics of individual men that are Watson and McLanahan 24 
 
 
correlated with reference group income; we believe this is the most likely threat to identification. 
For example, a low-income man living in a high-income area may be less able, less motivated, or 
less attractive in some unobservable way than a man who earns the same real income in another 
city where there are fewer opportunities for men like him.  We do not have an experimental 
design, so our results should be interpreted with the same caution as those derived from any 
observational study.  It is also important to note that even if a causal relationship between 
relative income and marriage could be definitively established, the identity story proposed here is 
only one possible explanation.   
 
D.  Alternative Marriage Ideals and Reference Groups 
  In Appendix Table 3, we experiment with alternatives to the median of the reference 
group and alternative reference groups.   We report results using alternative benchmarks between 
the 20
th and 80
th percentile of reference group income.  For white men, the slope change is more 
pronounced when using the 40
th to 60
th percentile rather than higher or lower percentiles.  The 
slope change for black men is most dramatic using an 80
th percentile hypothesized ideal, 
suggesting that our baseline specification may be understating the effect of relative income for 
this group.
25
  One might worry that the regression results stem from a particular functional form or 
artifact of the data.  To investigate this possibility, we perform a falsification exercise in which 
we randomly generate reference group medians using a normal distribution with the same mean 
and standard deviation as the actual distribution of reference group medians in the race/ethnicity-
  We also try using a more narrowly defined age group for the reference group, 25-
49 year-olds.  Though this reduces the sample available to estimate reference group medians, the 
results are quite similar to the baseline.   Watson and McLanahan 25 
 
 
education-year cell.  Using this approach, we find that the ratio of a man’s income to the median 
of a randomly selected reference group does not predict marriage (column IX of Appendix Table 
3).  This null result suggests that it is variation in relative income within race/ethnicity-
education-year cells that is driving the main findings. 
  We also experiment with reference groups based on metropolitan area-race/ethnicity 
groups and metropolitan area-education groups.  Both alternatives are consistent with the model, 
as shown in the final columns of Appendix Table 3. 
  Finally, we explore empirically based kink points, as described in the appendix.  These 
points of flattening in the income-marriage relationship are positively correlated with the 
reference group median, lending some validity to the use of the reference group median in our 
analysis.   
 
E.  Robustness 
 
  Appendix Table 4 investigates the sensitivity of the results to a variety of alternative 
specifications.  First, we use the dependent variable “ever married” and find similar results, as 
shown in column II.  We show in column III that the pattern is not driven by an effect of relative 
income on divorce, which is unsurprising given the relatively low rates of divorce among this 
age group.  In columns IV and V we experiment with different ways of trimming the tails of the 
income distribution.  Neither including the full sample nor excluding the top and bottom ten 
percent substantively changes the results.  In column VI, we allow the effect of age to vary by 
year.  In column VII, we include a control for the log of income in addition to the detailed 
percentile dummies.  In column VIII, we control for metropolitan area-specific time trends.  In 
column IX, we flexibly control for the rates employment rate in the man’s metropolitan area-
race/ethnicity-income group.
26  In column X, we allow the dummy for “under the median” to Watson and McLanahan 26 
 
 
interact with the man’s employment status and full time status and with the metropolitan area sex 
ratio, housing price index, and AFDC benefit level.  None of these modifications affects the 
results very much.   
 
F.  Magnitude of the Effects 
  The coefficients in the regression model do not immediately provide a sense of the 
magnitude of the estimated effects.  To do so, we use the model to predict marriage rates if the 
median income of the reference group increased by ten percent (holding absolute income and all 
other factors constant).  The results suggest that a ten percent increase in the hypothesized 
“marriage ideal” reduces marriage by one to three percent depending on the race/ethnicity group, 
education level, and year.  Details are reported in Appendix Table 5. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
  The primary contribution of this paper is to document a relationship between relative 
income and marriage, conditional on absolute income.  We find that income relative to a 
threshold determined by a local reference group is an important determinant of marriage for men 
below the threshold, but not those above it.  The association is robust to the inclusion of a 
number of controls and alternative specifications. 
  We propose an identity model to explain the relationship between relative income and 
marriage.  Alternative models might also predict a link between relative income and marriage, 
conditional on absolute income.  For example, the (unobservable) price of “spousal labor” 
(Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993) might be higher in a marriage market with richer men.
27  There 
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control variables, and we cannot rule out the possibility that the relationship is due to 
unobservable characteristics of men that are associated with where they live.  Nevertheless, the 
results are consistent with an identity framework, and the identity framework is corroborated by 
previous qualitative work.   
  In the context of the identity model, the evidence presented here suggests that men falling 
below an idealized norm of marriage choose to defer marriage rather than face an identity loss 
for failing to fulfill the prescriptions associated with marriage.  A man’s “marriageability” 
appears to be related not only to his absolute level of income, but to income relative to a middle-
class ideal determined by a local reference group.  The model predicts that raising reference 
group incomes by ten percent reduces marriage by about two percent. 
  One possibility we have not explored is that the financial ideal associated with marriage 
may be endogenous to marriage rates.  As marriage becomes more rarefied and the financial gap 
between married and unmarried couples widens, the marriage ideal may increase.  The resulting 
cycle is difficult to identify empirically, but suggests the role of relative income may be 
understated here.   
  Finally, we note that while marriage has been proposed as an anti-poverty measure, our 
results imply that anti-poverty (or, more precisely, anti-inequality) measures may increase 
marriage rates.  On the other hand, as long as it remains difficult for low-income couples to 
“keep up with the Joneses,” the evidence suggests that these couples are likely to defer marriage 




Empirically Based Kink Points 
  For each metropolitan area-education-race-year group, we explore potential kink points at 
1000 dollar intervals between the 20
th and 80
th percentiles of the reference group income 
distributions.  The empirical kink point is that which generates the largest statistically significant 
slope change in the income-marriage relationship.   
  For white men, in 1171 of 1308 metropolitan area-education-race-year cells (representing 
about 97.5 percent of the population), there is a statistically significant flattening of the income-
marriage relationship evident in the data.  The empirical kink points vary widely, and only about 
a third are between the 40
th and 60
th percentiles of the reference group income distribution.  This 
is likely due to the small sample available to estimate each kink point.  However, the reference 
group median is near the median of the empirical kink points:  among metropolitan area-
education-race-year cells with an estimated kink point, 50 percent are below the reference group 
median (46 percent when weighted by population).   
  Furthermore, empirical kink points are highly correlated with the reference group median 
income.  The correlation is 0.66, ranging from 0.33 to 0.75 within education-year groups.  In a 
regression setting with the empirical kink point as the dependent variable and including 
metropolitan area dummies and education*year dummies , the coefficient on the reference group 
median is 0.82 and is highly significant (see Appendix Table 6).  This coefficient implies that the 
empirical kink point increases $820 with each $1000 increase in reference group income. 
  For black and Hispanic men, empirical kink points are more difficult to estimate, 
presumably because of the smaller sample size in each metropolitan area-education-race-year 
cell.  For black men, significant kink points can be identified in 474 of 1006 cells, representing Watson and McLanahan 29 
 
 
about 60 percent of the population.  For Hispanic men, there is a significant flattening in 255 of 
480 cells, representing about 70 percent of the population.  The correlation between empirical 
kink points and reference group medians is around 0.66 in both cases, though the weighted 
regressions do not have statistically significant coefficients after controlling for metropolitan 
area and education*year dummies.  The point estimates suggest that the empirical kink point 
increases by $560-$700 with each $1000 increase in reference group income after controlling for 
metropolitan area and education*year. 
  In sum, there is a flattening of the income-marriage relationship for most sub-groups in 
the sample.  These empirical kink points tend to be higher in metropolitan areas and years in 
which the reference group median is higher. 
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Table 1.   
Reference Group Medians and Fraction Under Median 
                                                                          
                              Native White Non-Hispanic Men 
           
                             
 
       
 
Average Reference Group Median 
 
Fraction Under Median 
             
1980  1990  2000 
   
1980  1990  2000 
           
<HS  37,798  32,594  30,104 
 
<HS  0.72  0.74  0.70 
           
HS exactly  41,536  37,520  36,284 
 
HS exactly  0.64  0.66  0.67 
           
SC  44,848  43,816  43,175 
 
SC  0.68  0.69  0.70 
           
CG+  58,697  63,034  66,151 
 
CG+  0.79  0.77  0.78 
           
All  47,690  46,773  49,078 
 
All  0.71  0.71  0.72 
                              Native Black Non-Hispanic Men 
           
                             
 
       
 
Average Reference Group Median 
 
Fraction Under Median 
             
1980  1990  2000 
   
1980  1990  2000 
           
<HS  28,007  26,730  24,835 
 
<HS  0.73  0.84  0.79 
           
HS exactly  31,031  28,137  27,830 
 
HS exactly  0.63  0.71  0.68 
           
SC  35,712  34,707  34,376 
 
SC  0.65  0.71  0.69 
           
CG+  45,049  47,653  48,695 
 
CG+  0.72  0.75  0.73 
           
All  33,336  32,576  33,271 
 
All  0.67  0.73  0.70 
                              Native Hispanic Men 
             
                             
 
       
 
Average Reference Group Median 
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1980  1990  2000 
   
1980  1990  2000 
           
<HS  30,077  26,477  22,738 
 
<HS  0.66  0.71  0.64 
           
HS exactly  33,896  30,581  28,247 
 
HS exactly  0.58  0.62  0.59 
           
SC  39,098  38,121  36,429 
 
SC  0.63  0.64  0.65 
           
CG+  48,120  51,461  50,989 
 
CG+  0.75  0.73  0.72 
           
All  36,217  34,946  33,896 
 
All  0.63  0.65  0.64 
                                                                          
Note:  <HS refers to men without a high school degree, HS exactly refers to men with exactly 12 years of schooling, SC refers to men 
with some college but no four-year degree and CG refers to men with a four-year college degree or more education. 
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Table 2.  
        Sample Means of Key Variables 
     
                        
White Sample (N=1,215,527)  1980  1990  2000 
                        
Individual Characteristics 
     
 
Married (and living with spouse)  0.65  0.56  0.51 
 
Divorced  0.03  0.03  0.03 
 
Married Ever  0.76  0.66  0.60 
 
Married (household head sample)  0.74  0.67  0.60 
 
Cohabiting (household head sample)  0.05  0.10  0.14 
 
Residential Father (household head sample)  0.54  0.48  0.43 
 
Total Income, $2000  38,142  37,867  39,811 
 
Age  29.34  29.58  29.71 
 
Employed  0.92  0.93  0.92 
 
Employed Full-Time Full-Year  0.72  0.74  0.76 
 
High School Exactly  0.32  0.32  0.27 
 
Some College  0.26  0.31  0.32 
 
College Graduate or More  0.33  0.30  0.37 
 
Ratio of Income to Ref.Group Median if Under  0.60  0.60  0.59 
 
Ratio of Income to Ref.Group Median if Over  1.31  1.36  1.43 
          MSA Characteristics 
     
 
MSA-Year Race/Ethnicity-Specific Sex Ratio  1.03  1.01  1.01 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Black  0.12  0.12  0.12 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Native Hispanic  0.04  0.05  0.06 
 




MSA-Year Fraction Immigrant  0.08  0.10  0.13 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Under 18  0.28  0.25  0.26 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Under 65  0.89  0.88  0.88 
 
MSA-Year Fraction High School Exactly  0.34  0.32  0.31 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Some College  0.17  0.26  0.28 
 
MSA-Year Fraction College Grad  0.18  0.23  0.27 
 
MSA-Year Male Emp.-to-Pop. Ratio (ages 18-64)  0.82  0.82  0.78 
 
Male Predicted Employment Demand Index  0.66  0.60  0.60 
 
Female Predicted Employment Demand Index  0.38  0.41  0.43 
 
Housing Price Index  70.79  122.84  176.20 
 
Real Housing-Price-Adjusted AFDC Benefit, 
$2000  781.39  597.79  424.44 
 
Population  769,952  884,396  898,573 
                        
Black Sample (N=160,203)  1980  1990  2000 
                        
Individual Characteristics 
     
 
Married (and living with spouse)  0.51  0.36  0.35 
 
Divorced  0.09  0.08  0.06 
 
Married Ever  0.68  0.51  0.47 
 
Married (household head sample)  0.65  0.55  0.49 
 
Cohabiting (household head sample)  0.08  0.17  0.21 
 
Residential Father (household head sample)  0.57  0.51  0.48 
 
Total Income, $2000  26,797  24,012  26,607 
 
Age  29.22  29.49  29.64 
 
Employed  0.81  0.81  0.79 
 




High School Exactly  0.40  0.42  0.40 
 
Some College  0.25  0.32  0.35 
 
College Graduate or More  0.13  0.13  0.16 
 
Ratio of Income to Ref.Group Median if Under  0.54  0.52  0.55 
 
Ratio of Income to Ref.Group Median if Over  1.36  1.34  1.38 
          MSA Characteristics 
     
 
MSA-Year Race/Ethnicity-Specific Sex Ratio  1.20  1.18  1.19 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Black  0.18  0.18  0.18 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Native Hispanic  0.04  0.04  0.06 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Native Other  0.01  0.01  0.03 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Immigrant  0.08  0.11  0.14 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Under 18  0.28  0.25  0.26 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Under 65  0.90  0.89  0.89 
 
MSA-Year Fraction High School Exactly  0.33  0.32  0.30 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Some College  0.16  0.25  0.27 
 
MSA-Year Fraction College Grad  0.18  0.23  0.28 
 
MSA-Year Male Emp.-to-Pop. Ratio (ages 18-64)  0.82  0.81  0.78 
 
Male Predicted Employment Demand Index  0.66  0.61  0.60 
 
Female Predicted Employment Demand Index  0.38  0.42  0.43 
 
Housing Price Index  70.31  122.30  172.00 
 
Real Housing-Price-Adjusted AFDC Benefit, 
$2000  699.44  540.85  383.64 
 
Population  868,969  983,872  1,008,410 
                        
Hispanic Sample (N=76,803)  1980  1990  2000 




     
 
Married (and living with spouse)  0.64  0.50  0.44 
 
Divorced  0.05  0.06  0.05 
 
Married Ever  0.77  0.63  0.56 
 
Married (household head sample)  0.76  0.66  0.60 
 
Cohabiting (household head sample)  0.06  0.13  0.18 
 
Residential Father (household head sample)  0.64  0.56  0.52 
 
Total Income, $2000  30,878  29,588  30,019 
 
Age  29.06  29.21  29.22 
 
Employed  0.88  0.88  0.84 
 
Employed Full-Time Full-Year  0.62  0.63  0.65 
 
High School Exactly  0.35  0.38  0.36 
 
Some College  0.26  0.33  0.34 
 
College Graduate or More  0.14  0.12  0.16 
 
Ratio of Income to Ref.Group Median if Under  0.58  0.57  0.59 
 
Ratio of Income to Ref.Group Median if Over  1.35  1.39  1.44 
          MSA Characteristics 
     
 
MSA-Year Race/Ethnicity-Specific Sex Ratio  1.04  1.03  1.04 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Black  0.09  0.09  0.09 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Native Hispanic  0.13  0.14  0.16 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Native Other  0.02  0.03  0.04 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Immigrant  0.13  0.18  0.22 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Under 18  0.28  0.26  0.27 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Under 65  0.90  0.89  0.89 
 
MSA-Year Fraction High School Exactly  0.32  0.29  0.28 
 
MSA-Year Fraction Some College  0.20  0.28  0.28 
 
MSA-Year Fraction College Grad  0.19  0.23  0.27 
 




Male Predicted Employment Demand Index  0.65  0.61  0.61 
 
Female Predicted Employment Demand Index  0.38  0.42  0.43 
 
Housing Price Index  71.89  129.71  172.88 
 
Real Housing-Price-Adjusted AFDC Benefit, 
$2000  819.57  657.03  475.00 
 
Population  1,055,140  1,348,875  1,485,750 
              
Notes:  White Sample refers to native non-Hispanic white men ages 25-34; Black sample refers to native non-Hispanic black men; 
Hispanic sample refers to native Hispanic men.   Married Now refers to men married and living with a spouse.  Cohabition and 
residential fatherhood are based on subsamples of household heads and their partners; see text for details.    Watson and McLanahan 41 
 
 
Table 3.  
            Effect of Ratio to Median of Income Fully Employed in Reference Group on Marital Status, By Race/Ethnicity,   
Native Born Men Ages 25-34 











Hispanic  Hispanic 
 
(mean=0.57)  (mean=0.57)  (mean=0.57)  (mean=0.57)  (mean=0.40)  (mean=0.51) 
 
I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
                    
Ratio Income/Ideal if Under 
Reference Group Median 
   
0.4677**  0.3813**  0.1619**  0.2644** 
     
(0.0079)  (0.0251)  (0.0375)  (0.0546) 
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over 
Reference Group Median 
   
0.0572**  -0.0298*  0.0254  -0.0404 
     
(0.0051)  (0.0143)  (0.0153)  (0.0242) 
Under Reference Group Median 
 
-0.0816**  -0.4171**  -0.3995**  -0.1603**  -0.3142** 
   
(0.0036)  (0.0121)  (0.0270)  (0.0364)  (0.0577) 
Log (Real Total Income)  0.1254**  0.0969**  -0.0377** 
     
 
(0.0024)  (0.0028)  (0.0022) 
      Employed  0.0694**  0.0762**  0.0790**  0.0777**  0.0760**  0.0535** 
 
(0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0049)  (0.0076) 
Employed Full Time Full Year  0.0669**  0.0697**  0.0477**  0.0461**  0.0172**  0.0205** 
 
(0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0028)  (0.0037)  (0.0044) 
CMSA Sex Ratio (within 
race/ethnicity group)  0.3693**  0.3851**  0.4090**  0.4112**  0.1369*  0.0731 
 
(0.0915)  (0.0871)  (0.0722)  (0.0781)  (0.0522)  (0.0948) 




(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Log (Real Adjusted AFDC 
Benefits)  -0.0179  -0.0176  -0.0230*  -0.0253*  -0.0298  -0.0385 
 
(0.0117)  (0.0115)  (0.0114)  (0.0112)  (0.0298)  (0.0322) 
             
              Adjusted Income*Education 
Dummies*Year Dummies 
     
yes  yes  yes 
Age Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year*Ed Group Dummies  yes  yes  yes 
      Additional Time-Varying 
CMSA controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
CMSA Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
                    
Slope Change 
   
-0.4105**  -0.4111**  -0.1365**  -0.3048** 
     
(0.0099)  (0.0281)  (0.0343)  (0.0558) 
                                  
Number of Observations  1,215,509  1,215,509  1,215,509  1,215,527  160,203  76,803 
Number of CMSA-Year Cells  330  330  330  330  255  123 
R-squared  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.15 
                    
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate staistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively.  Regression sample excludes top and bottom 1 percent of income distribution in each metro area-year-racegroup and 
those not living in households under the 1980 definition.  Additional CMSA controls include race/ethnicity distribution in CMSA 
(fraction native non-Hispanic black, fraction native Hispanic, fraction native non-Hispanic non-white non-black, fraction foreign 
born), age distribution in CMSA (fraction under 18, fraction under 65), education distribution in CMSA (fraction high school exactly, Watson and McLanahan 43 
 
 
fraction some college exactly, fraction college graduate or more), predicted employment demand for men, predicted employment 
demand for women, and log of population.  Education Groups include less than high school, high school exactly, some college, and 
college graduate or more.Reference Group Median is median income of full-time full-year male workers ages 18-64 in the CMSA-
year-race/ethincity-education group. Adjusted income dummies reflect adjustment for cost of living as described in text. 




              Effect of Reference Group Median on Cohabitation 
and Family Structure 
         
                                                 
     
I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
                    Panel A.  Native Non-
Hispanic White Men                      
     
Full Household Head Sample  Co-residing  Co-residing 
             
 Sample  With Kids 
                 
Sample 
     









Variable:  Married  Cohabiting  Co-residing  With Kids  Married  With Kids  Married 
     
(mean=0.68)  (mean=0.09)  (mean=0.23)  (mean=0.48)  (mean=0.88)  (mean=0.63)  (mean=0.96) 
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Marriage 
Ideal  0.2551**  -0.0721**  -0.1827**  0.2707**  0.1129**  0.2237**  0.0568** 
     
(0.0285)  (0.0128)  (0.0215)  (0.0236)  (0.0187)  (0.0242)  (0.0106) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Marriage 
Ideal  -0.0102  0.0124*  -0.0024  0.0170  -0.0256**  -0.0036  0.0001 
     
(0.0119)  (0.0057)  (0.0091)  (0.0128)  (0.0094)  (0.0105)  (0.0055) 
                   
 
Slope Change  -0.2653**  0.0845**  0.1804**  -0.2537**  -0.1385**  -0.2273**  -0.0566** 
     
(0.0243)  (0.0117)  (0.0172)  (0.0208)  (0.0172)  (0.0202)  (0.0089) 
                    Panel B.  Native Non-
Hispanic Black Men                      Watson and McLanahan 45 
 
 
     
Full Household Head Sample  Co-residing  Co-residing 
             
 Sample  With Kids 
                 
Sample 
     









Variable:  Married  Cohabiting  Co-residing  With Kids  Married  With Kids  Married 
     
(mean=0.57)  (mean=0.15)  (mean=0.28)  (mean=0.52)  (mean=0.79)  (mean=0.72)  (mean=0.88) 
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Marriage 
Ideal  0.0793+  -0.0447+  -0.0351  0.0359  0.0637+  0.0121  0.0539 
     
(0.0433)  (0.0260)  (0.0409)  (0.0381)  (0.0322)  (0.0403)  (0.0325) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Marriage 
Ideal  -0.0254  0.0197+  0.0065  0.0042  -0.0395*  0.0032  -0.0268* 
     
(0.0180)  (0.0117)  (0.0145)  (0.0155)  (0.0160)  (0.0141)  (0.0119) 
                   
 
Slope Change  -0.1047**  0.0644**  0.0417  -0.0317  -0.1031**  -0.0089  -0.0806** 
     
(0.0348)  (0.0226)  (0.0326)  (0.0311)  (0.0273)  (0.0343)  (0.0294) 
                                        Panel C.  Native 
Hispanic Men                      
     
Full Household Head Sample  Co-residing  Co-residing 
             
 Sample  With Kids 
                 
Sample 
     









Variable:  Married  Cohabiting  Co-residing  With Kids  Married  With Kids  Married 
     
(mean=0.66)  (mean=0.13)  (mean=0.21)  (mean=0.56)  (mean=0.83)  (mean=0.71)  (mean=0.93) 





if Under Marriage 
Ideal  0.2324**  -0.0891*  -0.1422**  0.1518*  0.1319*  0.0653  0.0942** 
     
(0.0533)  (0.0427)  (0.0506)  (0.0571)  (0.0502)  (0.0613)  (0.0347) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Marriage 
Ideal  -0.0405  0.0117  0.0282  -0.0017  -0.0332  0.0232  -0.0109 
     
(0.0270)  (0.0139)  (0.0245)  (0.0251)  (0.0205)  (0.0247)  (0.0140) 
                   
 
Slope Change  -0.2729**  0.1008*  0.1704**  -0.1534*  -0.1651**  -0.0421  -0.1051** 
     
(0.0526)  (0.0435)  (0.0498)  (0.0614)  (0.0496)  (0.0636)  (0.0345) 
                                                                     
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively.  Household head sample includes men reported as household heads or partners/roomates of female household heads.  Co-
residing sample includes members of household head sample who are married or living with a partner or female roommate.  Co-
residing with kids sample includes members of coresiding sample who have a partner with children living in the household.  Each 
column of a given panel represents a separate regression.  Regressions include adjusted income category dummies interacted with year 
and education group and all other baseline controls. 
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Appendix Table 1. 
            Sample Reference Group Medians and Fraction Under Median For Largest Metropolitan Areas (2000 
dollars) 
                                       
Native Non-Hispanic White Men 
           
   






                         
   
Reference Group Median Incomes 
Metropolitan Area 
           
 
Boston  34,895  30,644 
 
55,901  67,722 
 
 
Chicago  46,523  36,670 
 
61,093  69,459 
 
 
Dallas  36,116  29,632 
 
58,372  68,539 
 
 
Detroit  47,000  35,751 
 
66,890  71,502 
 
 
Houston  43,035  32,686 
 
65,128  73,544 
 
 
Los Angeles  41,872  33,708 
 
64,674  73,544 
 
 
New York  39,547  36,772 
 
63,674  77,222 
 
 
Philadelphia  38,140  32,686 
 
59,326  67,416 
 
 
San Francisco  44,756  36,129 
 
62,820  81,716 
 
 
Washington  39,547  32,686 
 
71,186  78,652 
 
               
                                       
   
Fraction Under Reference Group Median 
Metropolitan Area 
           
 
Boston  0.74  0.69 
 
0.78  0.75 
 
 
Chicago  0.71  0.78 
 
0.76  0.74 
 
 
Dallas  0.69  0.72 
 
0.75  0.76 
 
 
Detroit  0.76  0.74 
 
0.78  0.77 




Houston  0.65  0.76 
 
0.75  0.79 
 
 
Los Angeles  0.73  0.77 
 
0.80  0.78 
 
 
New York  0.76  0.80 
 
0.79  0.75 
 
 
Philadelphia  0.76  0.76 
 
0.80  0.78 
 
 
San Francisco  0.80  0.75 
 
0.80  0.73 
 
 
Washington  0.74  0.72 
 
0.84  0.82 
 
               
                                       
Native Non-Hispanic Black Men 
           
               
   






                         
   
Reference Group Median Incomes 
Metropolitan Area 
           
 
Boston  27,919  26,558 
 
46,523  56,180 
 
 
Chicago  32,663  30,031 
 
46,674  49,847 
 
 
Dallas  24,198  23,493 
 
40,721  46,987 
 
 
Detroit  40,000  26,558 
 
54,116  54,137 
 
 
Houston  28,547  24,515 
 
46,523  48,012 
 
 
Los Angeles  30,244  25,536 
 
47,895  55,577 
 
 
New York  27,919  27,579 
 
46,081  51,073 
 
 
Philadelphia  30,244  24,515 
 
46,523  45,965 
 
 
San Francisco  34,895  28,601 
 
49,000  61,287 
 
 
Washington  30,244  27,579 
 
53,500  59,244 
 
               
                                       
   




           
 
Boston  0.71  0.79 
 
0.71  0.70 
 
 
Chicago  0.80  0.92 
 
0.70  0.70 
 
 
Dallas  0.71  0.82 
 
0.68  0.66 
 
 
Detroit  0.82  0.91 
 
0.71  0.72 
 
 
Houston  0.68  0.82 
 
0.64  0.75 
 
 
Los Angeles  0.86  0.91 
 
0.72  0.75 
 
 
New York  0.80  0.86 
 
0.78  0.70 
 
 
Philadelphia  0.82  0.88 
 
0.73  0.69 
 
 
San Francisco  0.87  0.90 
 
0.76  0.71 
 
 
Washington  0.73  0.80 
 
0.76  0.79 
 
               
                                       
Native Hispanic Men 
           
               
   






                         
   
Reference Group Median Incomes 
Metropolitan Area 
           
 
Boston  21,628  24,515 
 
39,791  48,315 
 
 
Chicago  37,221  24,515 
 
49,151  48,008 
 
 
Dallas  27,826  21,450 
 
48,279  51,073 
 
 
Detroit  42,715  27,579 
 
54,581  56,282 
 
 
Houston  30,244  23,493 
 
51,616  51,073 
 
 
Los Angeles  32,570  22,472 
 
48,884  52,094 
 
 
New York  24,430  23,493 
 
46,523  51,073 
 
 
Philadelphia  25,651  23,493 
 
52,047  51,073 
 
 
San Francisco  39,942  26,558 
 
49,791  61,287 




Washington  38,523  24,515 
 
60,477  64,351 
 
               
                                       
   
Fraction Under Reference Group Median 
Metropolitan Area 
           
 
Boston  0.61  0.66 
 
0.58  0.57 
 
 
Chicago  0.64  0.68 
 
0.68  0.64 
 
 
Dallas  0.58  0.62 
 
0.70  0.70 
 
 
Detroit  0.72  0.75 
 
0.73  0.75 
 
 
Houston  0.56  0.62 
 
0.69  0.70 
 
 
Los Angeles  0.71  0.70 
 
0.76  0.74 
 
 
New York  0.73  0.74 
 
0.68  0.66 
 
 
Philadelphia  0.63  0.79 
 
0.81  0.75 
 
 
San Francisco  0.78  0.74 
 
0.77  0.67 
 
 
Washington  1.00  0.72 
 
0.75  0.73 
 
               
                                       
Notes:  There are multiple areas with the same median in each year because reported incomes tend to clump at $1000 intervals in the 
raw data.  <HS Refers to less than high school; CG+ refers to four-year college graduate or more. 
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Appendix Table 2.   
              Exploring Alternative 
Explanations 
             
                           I  II  III  IV  V  VI 






















                 
                 
                 
                 
                  Panel A.  Native Non-
Hispanic White Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Ref. 
Median 
 
0.3813**  0.3010**  0.3230**  0.3829**  0.4029**  0.4151** 
     
(0.0251)  (0.0308)  (0.0312)  (0.0260)  (0.0249)  (0.0263) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Ref. Median 
 
-0.0298*  -0.0275*  -0.0332**  -0.0303*  -0.0335*  -0.0207 
     
(0.0143)  (0.0133)  (0.0125)  (0.0139)  (0.0151)  (0.0142) 
                 
                 
                  Panel B.  Native Non-                     Watson and McLanahan 52 
 
 
Hispanic Black Men 
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Ref. 
Median 
 
0.1619**  0.1607**  0.1335**  0.1695**  0.1796**  0.1349** 
     
(0.0375)  (0.0380)  (0.0398)  (0.0393)  (0.0384)  (0.0415) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Ref. Median 
 
0.0254  0.0074  0.0113  0.0318+  0.0178  -0.0081 
     
(0.0153)  (0.0158)  (0.0156)  (0.0161)  (0.0150)  (0.0199) 
                 
                 
                  Panel C.  Native 
Hispanic Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Ref. 
Median 
 
0.2644**  0.2539**  0.2515**  0.2646**  0.2794**  0.2614** 
     
(0.0546)  (0.0542)  (0.0581)  (0.0546)  (0.0545)  (0.0623) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Ref. Median 
 
-0.0404  -0.0511+  -0.0443  -0.0380  -0.0421+  -0.0294 
     
(0.0242)  (0.0269)  (0.0264)  (0.0239)  (0.0243)  (0.0378) 
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                  Appendix Table 2 
(continued).   
              Exploring Alternative 
Explanations 
             
                           VII  VIII  IX  X  XI  XII 
     
Assume 


















Ages 25 and 
26 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                  Panel A.  Native Non-
Hispanic White Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Ref. 
Median 
 
0.3772**  0.3726**  0.3732**  0.3792**  0.2163**  0.4398** 
     
(0.0250)  (0.0301)  (0.0245)  (0.0245)  (0.0303)  (0.0423) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Ref. Median 
 
-0.0241+  -0.0242+  -0.0326*  -0.0259+  -0.0252+  0.0400 
     
(0.0124)  (0.0134)  (0.0136)  (0.0137)  (0.0140)  (0.0296) 
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Panel B.  Native Non-
Hispanic Black Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Ref. 
Median 
 
0.1833**  0.1318**  0.1630**  0.1624**  0.1581**  0.1257+ 
     
(0.0435)  (0.0326)  (0.0370)  (0.0377)  (0.0369)  (0.0721) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Ref. Median 
 
0.0266  0.0310+  0.0257+  0.0254  0.0170  0.0637 
     
(0.0163)  (0.0161)  (0.0154)  (0.0153)  (0.0226)  (0.0478) 
                 
                 
                  Panel C.  Native 
Hispanic Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Under Ref. 
Median 
 
0.2583**  0.2364**  0.2670**  0.2652**  0.1592*  0.2201* 
     
(0.0543)  (0.0630)  (0.0552)  (0.0556)  (0.0639)  (0.0930) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal 
if Over Ref. Median 
 
-0.0317  -0.0402+  -0.0398  -0.0398  -0.0366  -0.0540 
     
(0.0228)  (0.0219)  (0.0245)  (0.0238)  (0.0231)  (0.0601) 
                 
                                            Watson and McLanahan 55 
 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively.  Each column within a panel represents a separate regression.  Regressions based on baseline specifications and include 
adjusted income category dummies interacted with year and education and all other controls.  See text for more details. 
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Appendix Table 3.   
                Exploring Alternative 
Ideals  and Reference 
Groups 
               
                             I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 















                    Panel A.  Native Non-
Hispanic White Men                         
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Percentile 
 
0.3813**  0.1142**  0.2128**  0.2782**  0.2698**  0.2070**  0.1085** 
     
(0.0251)  (0.0323)  (0.0288)  (0.0463)  (0.0549)  (0.0387)  (0.0290) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Over Ref. Percentile 
 
-0.0298*  -0.0307**  -0.0297**  -0.0288**  -0.0454**  -0.0641**  -0.0924** 
     
(0.0143)  (0.0051)  (0.0065)  (0.0096)  (0.0151)  (0.0185)  (0.0219) 




-0.4111**  -0.1449**  -0.2425**  -0.3070**  -0.3151**  -0.2711**  -0.2008** 
     
(0.0281)  (0.0318)  (0.0285)  (0.0426)  (0.0520)  (0.0369)  (0.0195) 
                    Panel B.  Native Non-
Hispanic Black Men                         
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Percentile 
 
0.1619**  0.1140*  0.2881**  0.3113**  0.4018**  0.4584**  0.4356** 
     
(0.0375)  (0.0491)  (0.0621)  (0.0777)  (0.0888)  (0.0705)  (0.0569) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Over Ref. Percentile 
 
0.0254  0.0438**  0.0736**  0.0905**  0.0675*  0.0358  0.0118 
     
(0.0153)  (0.0154)  (0.0226)  (0.0261)  (0.0260)  (0.0319)  (0.0447) 






-0.1365**  -0.0702  -0.2145**  -0.2208**  -0.3342**  -0.4226**  -0.4238** 
     
(0.0343)  (0.0484)  (0.0482)  (0.0612)  (0.0840)  (0.0667)  (0.0629) 
                    Panel C.  Native Hispanic 
Men                         
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Percentile 
 
0.2644**  0.0343  0.2110**  0.2621**  0.1960*  0.2606**  0.1954** 
     
(0.0546)  (0.0475)  (0.0544)  (0.0639)  (0.0863)  (0.0695)  (0.0560) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Over Ref. Percentile 
 
-0.0404  0.0037  0.0198  0.0173  -0.0214  -0.0518  -0.0765 
     
(0.0242)  (0.0175)  (0.0211)  (0.0274)  (0.0419)  (0.0536)  (0.0712) 




-0.3048**  -0.0306  -0.1912**  -0.2448**  -0.2174*  -0.3124**  -0.2719** 
     
(0.0558)  (0.0407)  (0.0512)  (0.0625)  (0.0916)  (0.0818)  (0.0808) 
                                                 
                    Appendix Table 3 
(continued).   
                Exploring Alternative 
Ideals  and Reference 
Groups 
               
                             VIII  IX  X  XI 
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Panel A.  Native Non-
Hispanic White Men                
     
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Percentile 
 
0.3900**  -0.0058  0.2866**  0.3663** 
     
     
(0.0276)  (0.0037)  (0.0404)  (0.0322) 
     
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Over Ref. Percentile 
 
-0.0286+  -0.0065+  -0.0123  -0.0179 
     
     
(0.0154)  (0.0039)  (0.0157)  (0.0136) 
     




-0.4186**  -0.0007  -0.2990**  -0.3842** 
     
     
(0.0302)  (0.0013)  (0.0409)  (0.0389) 
     
                    Panel B.  Native Non-
Hispanic Black Men                
     
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Percentile 
 
0.1499**  0.0021  0.2207**  0.3345** 
     
     
(0.0415)  (0.0083)  (0.0577)  (0.0747) 
     
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Over Ref. Percentile 
 
0.0245  -0.0022  0.0754**  0.0404+ 
     
     
(0.0166)  (0.0081)  (0.0207)  (0.0204) 
     




-0.1255**  -0.0044  -0.1453**  -0.2941** 
     
     
(0.0371)  (0.0037)  (0.0463)  (0.0704) 
     
                    Panel C.  Native Hispanic 
Men                
     
                   
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Percentile 
 
0.2291**  0.0003  0.2846**  0.3298** 
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(0.0655)  (0.0123)  (0.0620)  (0.0809) 
     
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Over Ref. Percentile 
 
-0.0533*  0.0041  -0.0120  0.0185 
     
     
(0.0258)  (0.0118)  (0.0293)  (0.0242) 
     




-0.2824**  0.0039  -0.2967**  -0.3113** 
     
     
(0.0700)  (0.0044)  (0.0620)  (0.0777) 
     
                                        
       
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively.  Each column within a panel represents a separate regression.  Regressions use baseline specification with changes as 
indicated and include adjusted income category dummies interacted with year and education and all other controls.  See text for more 
details. 
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Appendix Table 4. 
              Sensitivity Analysis 
             
                           I  II  III  IV  V  VI 



















                  Panel A.  Native Non-Hispanic 
White Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Median 
 
0.3813**  0.3431**  0.0071  0.3395**  0.3340**  0.3828** 
     
(0.0251)  (0.0244)  (0.0091)  (0.0311)  (0.0308)  (0.0252) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over 
Ref. Median 
 
-0.0298*  -0.0479**  0.0041  -0.0223**  -0.0414+  -0.0294* 
     
(0.0143)  (0.0169)  (0.0031)  (0.0049)  (0.0233)  -0.0142 
                 
                 
                  Panel B.  Native Non-Hispanic 
Black Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Median 
 
0.1619**  0.1057**  -0.0260  0.1641**  0.2025**  0.1620** 
     
(0.0375)  (0.0352)  (0.0185)  (0.0397)  (0.0431)  (0.0374) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over 
Ref. Median 
 
0.0254  -0.0065  -0.0140*  0.0044  0.0587*  0.0253 Watson and McLanahan 61 
 
 
     
(0.0153)  (0.0150)  (0.0061)  (0.0049)  (0.0280)  (0.0153) 
                 
                 
                  Panel C.  Native Hispanic 
Men                      
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Median 
 
0.2644**  0.2461**  0.0337  0.2624**  0.2394**  0.2651** 
     
(0.0546)  (0.0590)  (0.0328)  (0.0625)  (0.0586)  (0.0547) 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over 
Ref. Median 
 
-0.0404  -0.0014  0.0370+  -0.0041  -0.0721*  -0.0404 
     
(0.0242)  (0.0183)  (0.0202)  (0.0081)  (0.0335)  (0.0245) 
                 
                                            
                  Appendix Table 4 (continued). 
              Sensitivity Analysis 
             
                           VII  VIII  IX  X  XI 
 

























   
  
            Panel A.  Native Non-Hispanic                   




                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Median 
 
0.3894**  0.3890**  0.4572**  0.3786**  0.3851** 
 
     
(0.0252)  (0.0264)  (0.0340)  (0.0252)  (0.0260) 
 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over 
Ref. Median 
 
-0.0257+  -0.0269+  0.0231  -0.0290*  -0.0202 
 
     
(0.0143)  (0.0147)  (0.0195)  (0.0144)  (0.0125) 
 
                 
                 
                  Panel B.  Native Non-Hispanic 
Black Men                   
 
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Median 
 
0.1637**  0.1660**  0.2139**  0.1712**  0.1835** 
 
     
(0.0375)  (0.0391)  (0.0387)  (0.0398)  (0.0393) 
 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over 
Ref. Median 
 
0.0267+  0.0274+  0.0474**  0.0286+  0.0100 
 
     
(0.0154)  (0.0153)  (0.0179)  (0.0156)  (0.0161) 
 
                 
                 
   
  
            Panel C.  Native Hispanic 
Men                   
 
                 
                 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if 
Under Ref. Median 
 
0.2680**  0.2431**  0.3411**  0.2645**  0.2827** 
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(0.0544)  (0.0619)  (0.0583)  (0.0546)  (0.0591) 
 
 
Ratio Income/Ideal if Over 
Ref. Median 
 
-0.0380  -0.0444+  0.0022  -0.0406+  -0.0455+ 
 
     
(0.0245)  (0.0247)  (0.0293)  (0.0239)  (0.0235) 
 
                                         
  Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively.  Each column within a panel represents a separate regression. Regressions use baseline specification with changes as 
indicated and include adjusted income category dummies interacted with year and education and all other controls.   See text for more 
details. 
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Appendix Table 5. 
                      Quantifying the Magnitude of the Effects 
                 
                                                                
                          Native non-Hispanic White 
Men 
                   
     
Predicted  
     
Predicted  
         
     
Marriage 
Rates 
     
Marriage 
Rates 
         
     
 Using Actual 
     
 Using 10 
Percent 
         
     
Ref. Group 
Median 
     
Higher 
Median 




   
1980  1990  2000 
 
1980  1990  2000 
 
1980  1990  2000 
                         
 
Less Than HS  0.64  0.49  0.42 
 
0.63  0.48  0.41 
 
-0.020  -0.024  -0.027 
 
HS Exactly  0.67  0.55  0.47 
 
0.66  0.53  0.46 
 
-0.020  -0.024  -0.028 
 
Some College  0.64  0.57  0.51 
 
0.63  0.55  0.50 
 
-0.022  -0.024  -0.028 
 
College Grad+  0.62  0.55  0.51 
 
0.60  0.54  0.50 
 
-0.025  -0.027  -0.028 
 
All  0.64  0.55  0.50 
 
0.63  0.54  0.48 
 
-0.022  -0.025  -0.028 
                          Native non-Hispanic Black 
Men 
                   
                         
                         
   
1980  1990  2000 
 
1980  1990  2000 
 
1980  1990  2000 
                         
 
Less Than HS  0.39  0.22  0.18 
 
0.39  0.22  0.17 
 
-0.018  -0.023  -0.030 
 
HS Exactly  0.49  0.33  0.31 
 
0.48  0.32  0.30 
 
-0.017  -0.022  -0.025 
 
Some College  0.51  0.41  0.39 
 
0.50  0.41  0.38 
 
-0.017  -0.021  -0.023 
 
College Grad+  0.53  0.42  0.40 
 
0.52  0.41  0.39 
 
-0.017  -0.023  -0.023 
 
All  0.48  0.35  0.34 
 
0.47  0.34  0.33 
 
-0.017  -0.022  -0.024 





                     
                         
                         
   
1980  1990  2000 
 
1980  1990  2000 
 
1980  1990  2000 
                         
 
Less Than HS  0.63  0.39  0.34 
 
0.62  0.38  0.33 
 
-0.013  -0.019  -0.019 
 
HS Exactly  0.64  0.46  0.41 
 
0.63  0.46  0.40 
 
-0.012  -0.017  -0.018 
 
Some College  0.62  0.51  0.46 
 
0.61  0.50  0.45 
 
-0.015  -0.017  -0.020 
 
College Grad+  0.56  0.46  0.40 
 
0.55  0.45  0.39 
 
-0.019  -0.022  -0.024 
 
All  0.62  0.46  0.41 
 
0.61  0.46  0.40 
 
-0.014  -0.018  -0.020 
                                                                
Note:  Results based on baseline model.  Reference group medians have been artificially increased by ten percent and the status of 
under the reference group median and the ratio of income to the median have been recalculated for each individual. 
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Appendix Table 6. 
            Predicting Empirical Kink Points 
         









Hispanic  Hispanic  Hispanic 
 
Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted 
 
I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
                    
Reference Group 
Median  0.8211**  0.8196**  0.6371**  0.5676  0.6930*  0.6579 
 
(0.1482)  (0.1905)  (0.1938)  (0.3820)  (0.2573)  (0.4770) 
             
              Year*Ed Group 
Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
CMSA Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
                                  
Number of 
Observations  1171  1171  474  474  255  255 
R-Squared  0.540  0.671  0.573  0.595  0.564  0.604 
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Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on CMSA.  +, *,** indicate staistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively.   The unit of observation is the metropolitan area-race/ethnicity-education-year cell.  Weighted regressions are weighted 
by estimated reference group population. 
                         





Figure 1.   






Figure 2.   




                                                 
1 These figures exclude men living in group quarters.  Married refers to currently married and 
living with a spouse.  White men are native-born non-Hispanic white men; black men are native-
born non-Hispanic black men.  The analysis to follow is restricted to those residing in sample 
metropolitan areas; marriage rates for the sample exhibit similar disparities between high- and 
low-income men. 
2 Authors’ calculations using Census data (not shown).  Changes since 1980 have been relatively 
similar across income groups. 
3 As Burstein notes, “[t]he act of marrying can change not only the duration of a relationship but 
the willingness of the partners to take actions that benefit them as a couple while the relationship 
endures.” 
4 Burstein (2007) offers three justifications for policy intervention:  existing government policy 
may discourage marriage, couples may not be aware of the benefits of marriage, and the 
externalities associated with marriage. 
5 Burstein (2007) includes a review of the empirical literature on the relationship between 
marriage and tax and transfer policy.  While the tax code and transfer policy generate significant 
marriage penalties and subsidies for some couples, the evidence generally indicates small effects 
of these incentives on marriage decisions. 
6 Grossbard-Shechtman (1993) argues that the market for “spousal labor” may alter the decision 
to formally marry rather than cohabit.  In addition, because tax and transfer policy are sensitive 
to marital status per se, such policy might influence whether co-residential partners marry.  In 
the analysis, we control for state AFDC generosity and include year fixed effects to account for 
national changes in tax policy. Watson and McLanahan 71 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 We describe couples sharing a household as co-residing whether married or unmarried; we 
refer to unmarried co-residing couples as cohabiting. 
8 Of course, couples may consider their joint income rather than just male earnings.  Because 
women’s earnings are potentially endogenous to the marriage decision we do not incorporate 
them here. 
9 In most metropolitan area-race/ethnicity-education-year cells, 60 to 80 percent of the sample 
lies below the reference group median.  In some small cells the number is as high as 100 percent, 
as is evident in Appendix Table 1.  
10 Many thanks to Lara Shore-Sheppard for sharing the metropolitan area match. 
11 To be included in the sample, a metropolitan area must have at least 100 18-to-64 year-old 
men in the race/ethnicity group in the PUMS for all three Census years.  This ensures that the 
values of the marriage ideal are reliably estimated.  The restriction results in 85 metropolitan 
areas for the native non-Hispanic black sample and 47 metropolitan areas for the native Hispanic 
sample. 
12 As a robustness check, we assume that the earnings of married men are 90 percent of observed 
earnings at the time of the marriage decision (see Appendix Table 2) to account for the 
possibility of a labor market marriage premium. 
13 Results with different tails excluded are presented in Appendix Table 4. 
14 See Appendix Table 4.  Ever married includes the categories married with spouse present, 
married with spouse absent, separated, divorced, or widowed. 
15 The equations are estimated using the linear probability model for ease of interpretation. 
16 The welfare benefits data are from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 
state-level transfer program information, available at www.ukcpr.org. Watson and McLanahan 72 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 These include a man’s absolute income, race/ethnicity-specific sex ratios in the metropolitan 
area, and (in some specifications) a man’s rank in the local income distribution. 
18 The distribution is created after adjusting real income for cost-of-living differences across 
metropolitan areas.  Specifically, we follow Albouy (2008) and assume that housing represents 
36 percent of cost-of-living.  In the sensitivity analysis we try other ways of adjusting for cost-
of-living differences across areas. 
19 We lack the statistical power to examine effects by more detailed income ratio categories for 
black and Hispanic men. 
20 Results are similar if we allow the effect of income rank to vary by year.  
21 In the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, roughly three quarters of cohabiting men are living with 
unmarried partners rather than female roommates. 
22 For white and Hispanic men, the slope change in column V is 50-60 percent of the slope 
change in column I.    Comparing these two numbers does not precisely quantify the effect of 
marriage market considerations, however.  Some couples do not live together prior to marriage.  
Furthermore, search can continue within the context of unmarried cohabitation or even within 
marriage. 
23 For Hispanic men, the results are sensitive to the particular sample and we cannot say anything 
definitive. 
24 Indeed, Antonovics and Town (2004) note that a shock to earnings could affect the marriage 
decision, thereby potentially biasing estimates of a marriage premium. 
25 For Hispanic men, using the 70
th percentile yields a slightly bigger slope change than the 
baseline specification, but the difference is not economically meaningful. Watson and McLanahan 73 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 We control for employment of the reference group and employment of the group in the 
sample.  In particular, the fraction full-time (at least 35 hours per week and 50 weeks per year), 
part-time (at least 15 hours per week and 20 weeks per year), and any employment (at least one 
hour per week and at least one week per year) in each is included in the regression model.   
27 The Grossbard-Schechtman (1993) model would predict higher marriage rates for low-income 
men in most circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 